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There’s long been a debate whether corporate governance law
should require some duty to the public. The accepted wisdom is not to
require such a duty—that corporate profit maximization provides jobs
and other public benefits that exceed any harm. This is especially true,
the argument goes, because imposing specific regulatory requirements
and making certain actions illegal or tortious—what I’ll call “regulating
substance,” in contrast to “regulating governance”—can mitigate the
harm without unduly impairing corporate wealth production.

Whether that’s true in other contexts, I question if it’s true in the
context of systemic economic harm. My examination is based in part
on a forthcoming article1 and also parallels the efforts of a Working
Group (which I chair) of Fellows of the American College of
Bankruptcy, which is examining the same question under the laws of
various nations worldwide.

1

Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
1 (forthcoming Nov. 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644375.
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Risk-Taking, Misalignment, and Systemic Harm
Excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically important firms
is widely seen as one of the primary causes of the global financial
crisis. In response, governments have issued an array of regulation to
attempt to curb excessive risk-taking and prevent another crisis.

Many of these measures are designed to control excessive risktaking by aligning managerial and investor interests, implicitly
assuming that the investors themselves would oppose excessively risky
business ventures. These include, for example, requiring a systemically
important firm to tie management compensation to the firm’s long-term
performance, or requiring a systemically important firm to maintain socalled contingent capital, in which debt securities convert into equity
upon specified conditions. The assumption that investors themselves
would oppose excessively risky business ventures is flawed, however.
Therefore financial regulation based on the assumption’s validity is
unreliable.

The assumption is flawed because what constitutes “excessive”
risk-taking depends on the observer. Risk-taking is excessive from a
given observer’s standpoint if it has a negative expected value to that
observer—i.e., the expected costs to that observer exceed the expected
benefits. It is reasonable to assume that investors would oppose risky
business ventures with a negative expected value to them.
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The flaw, however, is that systemically important firms can
engage in risk-taking ventures that have a positive expected value to
their investors but a negative expected value to the public. That is
because much of the systemic harm from such a firm’s failure would be
externalized onto the public, including ordinary citizens impacted by an
economic collapse, causing widespread poverty and unemployment.

Corporate governance law creates this misalignment by requiring
managers of a firm to view the consequences of their firm’s actions,
and thus the expected value of corporate risk-taking, only from the
standpoint of the firm and its investors (effectively stakeholders). That
perspective ignores externalities caused by the actions.

Ordinarily this is sensible; managers could not feasibly govern if
they had to take into account the myriad small externalities that result
from corporate risk-taking. But risk-taking that causes the failure of a
systemically important firm could trigger a domino-like collapse of
other firms or markets, causing systemic externalities that severely
damage the economy. 2

Regulating Substance may be Inherently Insufficient
2

I am not today engaging the broader question: When regulating substance is
insufficient, should corporate governance law take into account other significant
externalities, such as harm to public health and welfare, non-systemic economic harm, or
climate change and other environmental harm? For analysis of that question, see Steven
L. Schwarcz & Edward A. Peck, “Regulating Governance in the Public Interest” (draft on
file with authors).
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There’s another reason, beyond the misalignment per se, why
regulating substance may be inherently insufficient. Excessive
corporate risk-taking is also tied to managerial judgment calls. For
example, poor decisions, bad judgment, and greed contributed to the
excessive corporate risk-taking that led to the financial crisis. To
control that risk-taking, regulation should also regulate governance.

Others have recognized these limitations
There is now a consensus that existing regulatory measures,
which primarily regulate substance, are inadequate. In a widely
attended meeting in October at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the
New York Times reported that “policy makers have made little
progress in figuring out how they might actually” prevent another
financial crisis.3 Donald Kohn, former Vice Chair of the Federal
Reserve Board, observed that the Fed “doesn’t really have the tools” to
prevent another crisis. Luc Laeven, the European Central Bank Director
General for Research, summarized the consensus reached at the
conference: “Both monetary policy and macroprudential [regulatory]
policy are not really very effective.” He then asked, “Do we have other
policies?”

3

See Binyamin Appelbaum, Skepticism Prevails on Preventing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
5, 2015, at B1.
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I believe we do have other policies, in the form of regulating
governance. Consider how to redesign financial regulation to
accomplish that.

I. REDESIGNING REGULATION

In making corporate decisions, managers currently have a duty to
the firm and its investors. To reduce systemic externalities, they should
also have a duty to society (a “public governance duty”) not to engage
their firms in excessive risk-taking that leads to those externalities. So
long as it does not unduly weaken wealth-producing capacity
(corporate wealth production being in the public interest), regulating
governance in this way would help to align private and public interests.

Regulating Governance Works Better also for Financial Change
In the financial context, regulating governance also has another
advantage over regulating substance. Regulating substance often
depends on regulators precisely understanding the financial
“architecture”—the particular design and structure of financial firms,
markets, and other related institutions—at the time the regulation is
promulgated. Because the financial architecture is constantly changing,
that type of grounded regulation has value as long as it is updated as
needed to adapt to those changes.
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But ongoing financial monitoring and regulatory updating can be
costly and is subject to political interference at each updating stage. As
a result, financial regulation of substance usually lags financial
innovation, causing unanticipated consequences and allowing
innovations to escape regulatory scrutiny. 4

Regulating governance, in contrast, can overcome that regulatory
time lag. To fulfill their governance duties, the managers of a firm that
is proposing to engage in a financially innovative but risky project must
try to obtain the most current information about the innovation and its
consequences.

II. TOWARDS REGULATORY ALIGNMENT: A PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE DUTY

Next consider the theory and practicality of a public governance
duty. Because only systemically important firms, by definition, could
engage in risk-taking that leads to systemic externalities, such a duty
should apply only to managers of those firms.

A. Situating a Public Governance Duty within Corporate
Governance Theory
4

This occurred in 2008, for example, when the pre-crisis financial regulatory framework,
which assumed the dominance of bank-intermediated funding, failed to adequately
address a collapsing financial system in which the majority of funding had become nonbank intermediated.
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Except to the extent it intentionally limits shareholder primacy, a
public governance duty would not be inconsistent with corporate
governance legal theory. It should most clearly be consistent with the
stakeholder model of governance, which considers the interests of
everyone affected by a firm’s actions to avoid anyone being unfairly
exploited. The public, of course, is affected by a firm’s risk-taking.
This model, however, adds little explanatory value because there is
fundamental disagreement on the extent to which non-investor
stakeholder interests should be taken into account, valued, and balanced
with shareholder interests.

A public governance duty would, at first glance, appear to be
inconsistent with the contractarian model of governance—that a firm is
a “nexus of contracts” among private parties. After all, members of the
public are not contracting parties. Contract law, however, does not limit
its application to contracting parties. Government should be able to
limit freedom of contracting when the contracting causes externalities.
The critical question is which externalities should count in limiting that
freedom.

Even under contract law, there is no absolute answer to that
question. But we need answer only a much more limited question:
Should systemic externalities count in limiting freedom of contract?
That question has already effectively been answered: systemic
externalities not only harm the public, who cannot contract to protect
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themselves, but also cause much more harm than non-systemic
externalities, including widespread poverty and unemployment. These
are exactly the type of externalities that should count in limiting
freedom of contract.

A public governance duty would technically be inconsistent with
the shareholder-primacy model. Proponents of shareholder primacy
argue that managers of for-profit corporations should govern the firm
solely for the best interests of its shareholders. They accept that firms
can cause externalities, but they believe the efficient response is for
government to regulate substance, without interfering with corporate
governance. However, where regulating substance is insufficient, as in
the case of controlling the excessive corporate risk-taking that causes
systemic externalities, the alternative should be to regulate corporate
governance.

Next consider a public governance duty’s practicality: how to
regulate governance without unduly weakening corporate wealthproducing capacity.

B. Practicality of a Public Governance Duty
Under a public governance duty, the managers of a systemically
important firm would not only have a private corporate governance
duty to the firm and its investors but also a duty not to engage in
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excessive risk-taking that could systemically harm the public. 5 That
public duty raises several practical issues.

1. Legally Imposing the Duty. How should a public governance
duty be legally imposed? Courts, for example, could create such a duty
through judicial decisions. Or legislatures could amend their
corporation laws to require such a duty. The latter may be preferred
because imposing such a duty broadly impacts public policy.

In the United States, for example, this would mean that a public
governance duty should be imposed either by state legislatures
(especially the Delaware legislature, because most domestic firms are
incorporated under Delaware law) or by the U.S. Congress. Because
corporation law in the United States is traditionally state, not federal,
states ideally should take the lead in imposing such a duty.

It is questionable, however, whether state legislatures are well
positioned to impose a public governance duty. Any given legislature
would be unlikely to want to pioneer such a duty because it could

5

Cf. John Carney, Big-Bank Board Game Puts Shareholders in Second Place, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 5, 2015 (noting a speech by U.S. Federal Reserve Governor
Daniel Tarullo suggesting that “corporate governance would need to change to broaden
the scope of boards’ fiduciary duties to reflect macroprudential [i.e., systemic] regulatory
objectives”). The nation of Iceland has actually enacted legislation that appears to
require, at least in principle, the managers of at least certain systemically important firms
to “operate[] [their firms] in the interests of . . . shareholders . . . and the entire national
economy.” Ministry of Industries and Innovation, Act. No. 161/2002 on Financial
Undertakings.
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discourage firms from incorporating in its state. Furthermore, systemic
risk is a national and international problem, not usually a local state
problem. The “internalization principle” recognizes that regulatory
responsibilities should generally be assigned to the unit of government
that best internalizes the full costs of the underlying regulated activity.
For these reasons, Congress may be best situated to impose a public
governance duty.

2. Assessing and Balancing Costs and Benefits. How should
managers of a systemically important firm, or members of such a firm’s
risk committee, 6 assess and balance the public costs and private
benefits of a risk-taking activity? Let’s examine and compare two
approaches, one subjective and the other more objective and
ministerial. On a case-by-case basis, managers could choose which
approach to follow. Either approach would be needed only when
deciding on a risky project whose failure might, either itself or in
combination with other factors of which such managers are or should
be aware, 7 cause the firm to fail.8

6

Surprisingly, even risk committees required by the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States
are not obligated, and indeed may have no legal authority, to consider risks to the public.
7
Cf. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6
JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 69 (2014) (observing that “it is surely the board’s
responsibility to identify those risks which are of a magnitude and kind as to threaten the
firm’s stability”).
8
See earlier discussion observing that systemic externalities can result from risk-taking
that causes the failure of a systemically important firm.
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Managers following a subjective approach would simply consider
those costs and balance them against benefits—the same way they
would consider and balance any other relevant costs and benefits when
making a corporate governance decision. Their assessment and
balancing might, but would not necessarily, be documented or
explained. Managers may favor this approach because it would not
change their current behavior.

This subjective approach would have at least three drawbacks,
however. First, because the consequences of a systemic collapse can be
devastating to the public, the decisionmaking process to mitigate that
harm should be more transparent. Second, managers following a
subjective approach may be subject to peer pressure to favor investor
profitability over avoiding public harm—especially when, as I later
argue, managers often have conflicts of interest that favor the firm’s
shareholders over the public. Third, although courts generally try to
avoid second-guessing management decisions, even managers should
want to follow an approach that provides an explicit safe harbor against
litigation—at least if the approach is relatively ministerial.

Consider how to craft a possible ministerial safe-harbor objective
approach, using the generic example of a systemically important firm
engaging in a risky project that could be profitable. The expected
private benefits would be the expected value of the project to the firm’s
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investors (usually the shareholders). The expected public costs would
be the expected value of the project’s systemic costs.9

In large part, the firm’s managers should have sufficient
information, or at least much more information than third parties, about
these values. For example, managers should have much more
information than third parties about valuing the chance of the project
being successful, the value to investors from that success, the loss from
the project’s failure, and the chance of the firm failing as a result of the
project’s failure.

The exception, however, is valuing the systemic costs if the firm
fails. That valuation should be a public policy choice. It might be
based, for example, on the estimated cost of a government bailout to
avoid a systemic failure. Such an estimate could be made by the
government as part of the process of designating a firm as
“systemically important,” and thereafter periodically updated by the
government.

From a strict (Kaldor-Hicks) economic efficiency standpoint, the
project would be efficient if its expected value to investors exceeds the
expected value of its systemic costs. As a public policy matter,
however, simple economic efficiency may be insufficient because the
9

In Misalignment, supra note 1, I examine in detail how these costs and benefits could be
calculated.
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magnitude and harmful consequences of a systemic collapse, if it
occurs, could be devastating.

When balancing the costs and benefits of activities that might
pose great harm, policymakers normally apply a precautionary
principle directing regulators to err on the side of safety. Applying that
to our balancing, it may be appropriate (as Cass Sunstein has proposed
in another context10) to require “a margin of safety”—for example,
requiring that the expected value to investors considerably exceeds the
expected value of systemic costs—to demonstrate that a given risktaking activity is justified.

I’m not claiming that the foregoing approach to assessing and
balancing costs and benefits is perfect. Even if imperfect, however, it
should represent a step towards shaping corporate governance norms to
begin to take the public into account.

3. Enforcing a Public Governance Duty. Who should enforce a
public governance duty? Under existing corporate governance law,
shareholder derivative suits are the primary enforcement mechanism.
Shareholders would have no interest, however, in suing managers of

10

See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1003, 1014 (2003) (discussing a form of the precautionary
principle under which “regulation should include a margin of safety”).
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their firm for externalizing systemic harm. Therefore, the government,
by default, at least should have the right to enforce the public duty.

The government itself may be unable to effectively monitor a
firm’s internal compliance with the public governance duty until the
firm fails, when systemic consequences may be irremediable. To
facilitate better monitoring, regulation implementing a public
governance duty should include whistleblower incentives, including
anti-retaliation protection for managers or others involved in the risk
assessment who inform government officials of their firm’s
noncompliance and possibly also monetary rewards. Regulation
implementing a public governance duty might even impose an
obligation on managers involved in the risk assessment to inform
government officials of their firm’s noncompliance.

Another way to facilitate better monitoring, and more specifically
enforcement, of the public governance duty would be to incentivize
members of the public themselves. One such precedent is so-called qui
tam suits under which private citizens can sue alleged defrauders in the
name of the government. If the suit is successful or settled, the citizenplaintiff is entitled to a percentage of the award or settlement.

4. Business Judgment Rule as a Defense. A critical issue
concerns the business judgment rule as a defense to manager liability.
In the traditional corporate governance context, managerial risk-taking
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decisions are protected to some extent by this rule, which presumes that
managers should not be personally liable for harm caused by negligent
decisions made in good faith and without conflicts of interest—and in
some articulations of the business judgment rule, also without gross
negligence. The rule attempts to balance the goal of protecting
investors against losses against the goals of encouraging the best
managers to serve and avoiding the exercise of inappropriate judicial
discretion (as would occur if courts tried to second-guess business
judgments).

The business judgment rule arguably should apply differently in a
public-governance-duty context because one of the rule’s basic
assumptions—that there be no conflict of interest—may be breached.
The interest of a manager who holds significant shares or interests in
shares, or whose compensation or retention is dependent on share price,
is aligned with the firm’s shareholders, not with that of the public. To
that extent, the manager would have a conflict of interest.

But how should the business judgment rule be modified without
requiring courts to exercise inappropriate discretion or discouraging the
best people from serving as managers? One approach would be to
prevent conflicted managers who are grossly negligent—that is, who
fail to use even slight care in assessing systemic harm to the public—
from using the rule as a defense.
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Technically, this modification merely applies the gross
negligence standard that is often articulated as part of the business
judgment rule, though rarely utilized with any rigor. Because courts
routinely review whether other types of actions are grossly negligent,
they should not find it “inappropriate” or impractical to review
corporate risk-taking actions under a gross negligence standard. As a
practical matter, managers who follow a reasonable procedure to
balance public costs and private benefits should be protected. That
would effectively conform the business judgment rule’s publicgovernance-duty application to a duty of process care, a standard
commonly used. 11

5. To What Extent Should Managers be Protected Under D&O
Liability Insurance? Another issue is the extent to which managers
who become subject to liability for breaching the public governance
duty should be protected under directors and officers (“D&O”) liability
11

The requirement that managers use at least slight care in assessing systemic harm to the
public would also be consistent with the business judgment rule’s actual application in at
least some jurisdictions that do not formally articulate a gross negligence standard as part
of the rule. Delaware, for example, disallows business-judgment-rule protection for
managers who act in “bad faith.” See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907
A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he presumption of the business
judgment rule creates a presumption that a director acted in good faith” and that “[t]he
good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes . . . duties of care and loyalty”). Bad
faith is broadly defined as including conduct that “is known to constitute a violation of
applicable positive law.” Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (emphasis in original). Such conduct is interpreted to include a manager failing
to take “steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy” such a violation. In re
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). A
manager’s failure to use even slight care when assessing systemic harm to the public
under a legally mandated public governance duty would appear to be bad faith under
those interpretations
NBLSC-Conference Keynote - U. Chicago 6-23-16.docx

17

insurance, which indemnifies managers against personal liability.
Although D&O liability insurance is needed to incentivize good
managers and also to help ensure that sufficient funds are available to
properly incentivize private-action lawsuits, it might compromise the
deterrent effect of imposing personal liability. Furthermore, because the
magnitude of systemic harm is open ended, insurers may be reluctant to
offer D&O insurance covering breaches of the public governance duty.
At least one possible solution to these concerns would be to specify a
limit on the amount of the claim that could be imposed for breaching
the public governance duty and, like a deductible, to require managers
to be personally liable for some portion of that amount.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that corporate governance law should require some
duty to the public in order to help mitigate systemic economic harm.
Even if imperfect, such a duty represents (as mentioned) an important
step towards shaping corporate governance norms to begin to take the
public into account.
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